

20 July 1961

The project is considered to be a failure due to the fact that it has been not allowed to be developed and materialized at all, according to the original plan agreed upon in W. Actually, it was substituted by a completely different one imposed by Frankfurt Station which in practice nullified the original plan.

Contrary to the original project by which C was supposed to cover the whole of Western Europe, he was restricted in his operations to West Germany alone. Oddly enough, the revised Frankfurt plan which amounted to an abandonment of the actual project and its full rejection, was presumably considered to be a testing ground for purposefulness and success of the project itself (and C's capability to implement it). Parallel with geographic and "operational" restriction (elimination of other than touristic operations) went a time curtailment limiting the testing period to one year only. On the whole it seemed to be a purely mechanical approach based on the principle of "quota fulfilling". The latter envisaged 2-3 "good touristic operations".

From the very beginning C pointed out and continued to stress all the time that Germany alone with her comparatively poor potential was not sufficient for development of the project. Restricting of his activities to Germany which had to be proved to be productive "by all means" was identical with operating against any "law of marginal revenue" and meant missing and wasting of good opportunities outside of Germany. Frankfurt's parochial approach plus lack of an agreed policy and co-ordination on the subject between the latter (Frankfurt) and W. was bound to create some frustrating situations which left with C. a strong impression of a big bureaucratic mess existing inside the Firm.

Frankfurt's plan of March 1961 to extend C's activities into German potential was, of course, to be eventually very conducive to "quota fulfilment" but on the other hand it was again contrary to original project (concentration on Ukrainian potential).

Frankfurt Station seemed to be somewhat "obsessed" with suspicion that C. might use his assignment primarily for his party-political operations and hence, presumably, generated the strong tendency of complete control of his activities amounting sometimes to some sort of a ~~control~~ jacket on the one hand and insistence on introducing his agents to the case officer, on the other. In some situations, however, the latter approach would not serve its purpose and could ~~jeopardize~~ <sup>jeopardize</sup> operations.

In general, of some influence was also the fact of some new apprehensions on the part of emigres created by a new course of Soviet internal politics which was interpreted by them as a reversal of so called liberal trend of 1956-58. Many potential visitors among emigres took consequently a more cautious attitude of wait and see because of eventual risks.

The original project has had and still has good chances to be successful provided it will be realized as a whole in geographical and operational sense. The potential itself varies from country to country and with a net of good spotters all over Europe it should always produce 3-5 ~~good~~ <sup>good</sup> operations a year. A minimum period of 2 years is necessary for proper development of the project whereby the first year, beside use of opportunities, should be mainly devoted to building up of spotters net, and exploration and preparation of accesses to targets inside.